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 Justice sector reform is an arena of competition, where international development 
partners and Rwandan government institutions introduce contending ideas of justice through 
different development projects. In this ensuing competition of influence, how do international 
players utilize their roles as development partners to affect the accepted standards within 
Rwandan courts through established systems of monitoring and evaluation? And moreover, how 
do individuals in the Rwandan government perceive these partners, projects, and indicators? This 
study aims to answer these questions through an in-depth literature review, an analysis of 
development projects in the justice sector, and finally semi-structured interviews with key 
individuals in justice sector institutions. Through these methods, this study found that as opposed 
to offering different judicial values, government institutions and international development 
partners hold differing prioritizations of the same values. Furthermore, another root cause of 
tension within the sector is the ongoing struggle between maintaining institutional independence 
and harmonizing with sector-wide strategies. 
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In the aftermath of the 1994 Tutsi genocide, Rwanda was faced with the daunting process 
of rebuilding a country and reconciling its citizens. As with other post-conflict societies, the 
Rwandan process involved an ongoing dialogue between governments, NGOs, and citizens about 
transitional justice. For instance, this comprised a discussion of the ranking importance of the six 
major transitional justice themes: justice, reconciliation, healing, truth, forgiveness, and peace. 
Within a broader discussion of general thematic interplay were highly focused debates on the 
role each had to play in reconstruction and reconciliation. This research paper will pertain to the 
debates surrounding justice in post-genocide Rwanda.  
An analysis of the functions of justice inevitably engenders an exceedingly rich 
discussion of the type, the purpose, and the outcome of the employed justice mechanism. There 
are conceivably three different types of justice, including retributive, deterrent, and restorative.1 
First, retributive justice seeks to bring perpetrators to account through a “supposedly deserved” 
punishment.2 Similarly, deterrent justice maintains that punishment is essential, but not for the 
same reason.3 Rather, the punishment is meant to discourage convicted or potential criminals 
from repeating violations.4 Finally, restorative justice holds that punishment alone is an 
inadequate response and instead seeks to repair fractured relationships between perpetrators and 
victims.5 From these broad categories of justice stem a wide variety of mechanisms with 
different purposes and different results.  
In the case of Rwanda, these justice mechanisms included the Rwandan domestic courts, 
the Gacaca courts, and the United Nations’ International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
                                                 
1 Clark, Philip and Zachary D. Kaufman. “Establishing a Conceptual Framework: Six Key Transitional Justice Themes.” After Genocide: 
Transitional Justice, Post-conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and beyond. New York: Columbia UP, 2009. 191-205. Print. 
2 Ibid. Clark and Kaufman. 
3 Clark and Kaufman. 
4 Ibid. Clark and Kaufman. 
5 Clark and Kaufman. 
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Each system pursued a unique type of justice, possessed an arguably different purpose, and 
yielded a vastly different outcome. While the domestic courts and the Gacaca courts presented a 
Rwandan solution to a Rwandan problem, the ICTR presented a markedly different international 
response. The ICTR, for instance, offered a retributive and deterrent form of justice largely 
centered on punishing masterminds of genocide and complying with international legal 
standards. On the other hand, the domestic and Gacaca courts conformed to Rwandan legal 
standards and incorporated an additional focus on reconciliation. However, discrepancies also 
existed between the domestic courts and the Gacaca courts in the dichotomy between formal, 
deterrent justice systems and informal, reconciliatory justice systems. Compared to the domestic 
courts, Gacaca was far more focused on rebuilding fractured relationships and involving local 
communities than allocating punishments to convicted perpetrators. In contrast, the Rwandan 
court system offered a classical vision of formal justice, with albeit disparate legal standards.  
Because the ICTR was established by a UN Security Council resolution, it can be viewed 
as an instrument of international criminal justice. And because Gacaca is founded on traditional 
Rwandan methods, it can be viewed as an instrument of grassroots Rwandan criminal justice. As 
a result, the two are firmly rooted in separate spheres of judicial understanding. This became 
evident in what legal scholar, Victor Peskin, describes as “trials of cooperation,” between the 
Rwandan government and the tribunal.6 In this power struggle, the Rwandan government 
successfully used counter-shaming tactics to win the support of international powers, while the 
tribunal floundered in criticisms of its insensitivity to Rwandan needs.7 A series of isolated 
events including ICTR prosecutor Carla del Ponte’s “special investigations” into RPF war 
crimes, the Barayagwiza crisis, and also an incident involving judges laughing during the 
                                                 
6 Peskin, Victor. International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle For State Cooperation. London: Cambridge, 
2009. Print. 
7 Ibid. Peskin. 
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testimony of a rape victim culminated in a flood of international criticisms.8 Despite the ensuing 
power play between the Rwandan government and the ICTR, moments of cooperation and at 
times intransigence marked the resulting “trials of cooperation.”9 These trials represent one of 
the domains in which the Rwandan government and international community challenged its 
competing visions of justice.    
The conceptual framework of this paper views the international community and Rwandan 
community as two separate spheres once holding different visions of justice in the debates 
surrounding Gacaca and the ICTR. Whether these visions of justice remain different is an 
important area of interest in this paper. Furthermore, this paper will analyze the debates 
surrounding justice systems in Rwanda in the context of justice sector reform, as yet another 
arena of competition, where international and Rwandan players introduce contending ideas of 
justice. In this ensuing competition of influence, international players utilize their roles as 
development partners to affect the accepted standards within Rwandan courts through 
established systems of monitoring and evaluation. This paper seeks to understand whether the 
Rwandan government and its development partners have different or similar judicial values. 
Furthermore, do the judicial values, which guide debates over the ICTR and Gacaca, similarly 
appear in the arena of justice sector reform? Overall, this paper will address the various 
perceptions of justice through an analysis of the collaborative or competitive relationship 
between international development partners and Rwandan institutions in justice sector reform.  
                                                 
8 Peskin. 




 This paper is the product of an initial interest in international law and a resulting growing 
interest in local perceptions of justice in post-genocide Rwanda. Through the SIT Post-Conflict 
Transformation program, I was able to visit a number of organizations, which focused on varying 
elements of transitional justice. For instance, our visits to Travaux d’Intérêt Général (TIG) 
camps, the women’s association in Butare, and the ICTR resource center sparked a curiosity in 
the diversity of debates surrounding the allocation of justice after genocide. Moreover, a large 
motivating factor in researching this topic involves my strong interest in a future career in 
international law. In this era of transformative international politics, the growing strength of 
current international institutions reflects the increasing relevance of international law in 
responding to global crises. As a result, the lessons learned from institutions like the ICTR and 
Gacaca lend valuable insight into the successes and failures of various mechanisms of allocating 
justice in post-conflict societies. These factors led to an analysis of scholarly literature examining 
Gacaca courts, the ICTR, and their perceived success or failure. 
 After this literature review, it became apparent that the resulting opinions were markedly 
different depending on the framework used to analyze success. For instance, when Gacaca is 
measured against Western standards, it appears to have failed completely. But, if a locally 
accepted standard is utilized, Gacaca has performed exceedingly well in rebuilding community 
relationships and fostering reconciliation. Therefore, the baseline indicators used to examine 
progress in a certain justice system significantly alter the concluding opinion.  
Moreover, common themes emerged within the debates examining the success or failure 
of various justice mechanisms. Some scholars judged standards of justice on the basis of 
international legal standards, which could also be interpreted as largely Western-based. On the 
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other hand, some scholars attempted to analyze justice systems based on the institution’s stated 
objectives. For instance, the severity of punishment, the length of trial, and the qualification of 
judges were all factors under consideration when determining adequate justice. However, each of 
these categories presents a variety of possibilities that usually fall into separate Western and local 
classifications. The severity of punishment, for instance, significantly varies when comparing 
Gacaca and the ICTR, where the former can allocate community service sentences and the latter 
exclusively focuses on imprisonment. Whether these differences reveal a trend in Western and 
local versions of justice pose another point of interest to develop in following sections.  
This perceived tension between international and Rwandan justice institutions occurs in a 
variety of different settings. One of these settings includes the “trials of cooperation” between 
the Rwandan government and the ICTR.10 Another setting is the Rwandan justice sector, where 
international donors provide funding for development projects with defined visions of justice and 
development. The justice sector, therefore, serves as another arena for the intersection of 
competing or converging judicial values from Western institutions and Rwandan institutions. As 
with scholarly articles analyzing Gacaca and the ICTR, it is once again important to understand 
the factors against which progress is measured. In this case, the development partners and the 
government of Rwanda have clearly established targets and indicators. 
This research plays an important role in understanding one of the key themes of 
transitional justice. In post-conflict societies, debates over which theme and whose interests 
ought to be prioritized come to fore in establishing national policy. Furthermore, in the case of 
developing countries, like Rwanda, the relationship between donor countries and recipient 
countries is important in understanding international relations. In the specific context of post-
                                                 
10 Ibid. Peskin. 
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genocide justice in Rwanda, these themes are especially significant in their ability to lend insight 
into the type of relationship the Rwandan government has with its development partners and how 
that affects project outcomes. In the context of international law, it is important to analyze these 
relationships for a deeper understanding of what “international” or “universal” truly means. Do 
universal rights and international law truly exist? And if so, how are these concepts decided 
upon? More specifically, in Rwandan justice sector reform, do Western development partners 
impose their own vision of justice or is there compromise between governments? Another 
important theme of this research involves the importance of analyzing competing ideas of justice. 
Without a common understanding of how to evaluate progress, involved parties will inevitably 
have disagreements over whether progress was actually made. This is especially true in the case 
of justice sector reform, where targets and indicators were deliberately chosen to promote a 
determined form of justice.   
This paper will first address the academic debate surrounding Gacaca courts and the 
ICTR through an analysis of popular opinions surrounding the success and/or failure of each 
justice system. Then, this paper will describe the strategic plans, expected outcomes, and 
indicators used within the Rwandan justice sector, the Rwandan judiciary, and key international 
development partners. Then, it will provide an analysis of individuals’ perceptions of justice 
sector reform by comparing individual opinions with popular scholarly views. Finally, this paper 
will conclude with a summative evaluation of the relationship between the Rwandan government 
and its development partners. It will also include recommendations for future research initiatives 




This research aims to provide a better understanding of intersecting Western and 
Rwandan judicial values through an analysis of perceptions surrounding justice sector reform. 
More specifically, this research will focus on the relationship between the government of 
Rwanda and its development partners, whether it is largely collaborative or competitive. 
Furthermore, this paper will address how individuals working in the justice sector reconcile 
differing perceptions of justice and implement reform in a system of possibly competing judicial 
values. Also, this paper will provide a deeper understanding of whether the Rwandan judiciary, 
in the broader context of justice sector reform, is a space of tension between international and 
local actors. Finally, this paper seeks to answer whether the general themes found in academic 
debates surrounding Gacaca and the ICTR in any way influence these perceptions of justice in 
the Rwandan judiciary. 
 10 
Methodology   
 
The Rwandan justice sector, formally known as the Justice, Reconciliation, Law and 
Order (JRLO) Sector, has fourteen separate institutions. This research will concentrate on one of 
these institutions, the judiciary, and its corresponding international development partners, such as 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Commission 
(EC), and one European NGO.  
My approach to achieve the aforementioned research objectives included a thorough 
literature review, an analysis of development partner and government strategies in justice sector 
reform, and interviews with individuals involved in related projects. First, the literature review 
included academic literature surrounding perceptions of the success and/or failure of Gacaca 
courts, the ICTR, and Rwandan domestic courts. Second, the analysis of justice reform involved 
a study of the various strategies of international development partners and Rwandan government 
institutions involved in judiciary projects. Finally, interviews were conducted in a semi-
structured format to provide insight into personal experiences in justice sector reform, 
perceptions of development partners and indicators, and whether these indicators are a fair 
assessment of institutional success. 
A semi-structured format was chosen for its flexibility in allowing general questions to 
pave the way for more pointed questions and therefore more pointed answers. However, at times 
it was challenging to guide the interview in such a way that prompted direct answers to the given 
question. Instead, it was common for research participants to answer questions different from the 
one asked, in which case further and more detailed questioning was required. Research 
participants were chosen for their experience in justice sector reform, involvement with 
development partners or projects, fluency in English, and availability. Clearly, selecting 
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participants from such an educated and professional pool fails to address the wide spectrum of 
opinions among Rwanda’s diverse population. However, this paper does not aim to address 
every individual opinion as such, but rather to highlight individual opinions of the donor 
relationships with government institutions in the justice sector. Furthermore, this research does 
not aim to address the variety of local opinion surrounding justice sector reform, but rather 
understanding the intricate relationship between individuals in Rwandan institutions and their 
relationship with individuals in international partner institutions.  
My research participant pool included only one female professional. The absence of a 
representative female voice in my study, however, is not indicative of gender demographics in 
the justice sector. In fact, many of the high-ranking officials within the justice sector are women, 
including the JRLO Secretariat and the Netherlands development agency. However, due to 
participant availability, they were not included in the study. Another bias present within my 
research relates to my interviewer identity, which possibly influenced research participants’ 
answers. For instance, my identity as an American student may have caused members of 
Rwandan institutions to be less critical of international development partners. In terms of 
interviewer bias, I made an active effort to pose neutrally phrased questions that allowed for 
either favorable or critical interpretation of Rwandan institutions and its development partners. 
However, in asking more probing questions, my personal biases in favor or in opposition to 
certain actors may have become apparent and thereby influenced participants’ answers. 
According to limitations imposed by my university’s Institutional Review Board, this study 
maintains the confidentiality of all research participants. Therefore, names have been changed 




 This section will provide key information on the Gacaca courts, the ICTR, justice sector 
reform, corresponding international development partners and the JRLO. First, an in-depth 
literature review will introduce popular scholarly opinions surrounding the Gacaca courts and 
the ICTR. The purpose of these sections is to illustrate major judicial values that guide 
international and local critiques of justice mechanisms. Further interpretation of these themes 
and its relation to current justice sector reform will appear in a later section. Next, a brief 
overview of justice sector reform will offer insight into major trends and developments in years 
since the genocide. And finally, a comparative analysis of the strategic plan of the Rwandan 
justice sector and its development partners will offer a closer look into various methods of 
measuring progress. Background information on justice sector reform is meant to provide a 




Proposed between May 1998 and March 1999 in consultative meetings with the 
president, the Gacaca court system slowly came to fruition.11 Because the Rwandan domestic 
courts were unable to prosecute the hundreds of thousands of perpetrators in a timely manner, a 
new innovative solution was required. This solution was found in the transformation of a 
traditional community-based conflict resolution method known as Gacaca (grass) into a justice 
system meant to prosecute perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity within Rwanda. 
In February 2001, Rwanda’s parliament adopted the Organic Law for the Creation of Gacaca 
                                                 
11 Uvin, Peter, and Charles Mironko. "Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda." Global Governance 9 (2003): 219-31. Print. 
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Jurisdiction. Although there are notable differences between the traditional Gacaca and the 
modified version, similarities also exist. For instance, the judges, known as inyangamugayo 
(meaning people of integrity) are traditionally community elders who have been elected based on 
their personal integrity and moral reputation.12 Moreover, the modified Gacaca committed to the 
traditional idea of community involvement in which public hearings and community 
participation foster reconciliation. Finally, Gacaca is similar to its traditional counterpart due to 
its focus on restorative justice by which punishment is not the sole objective. 
 The Organic Law provided for the creation of around 10,000 Gacaca courts, including 
one in every cell, sector, district, and province in the country.13 Each Gacaca court is comprised 
of three functioning parts: a general assembly, a seat, and a coordinating committee. First, the 
general assembly consists of the entire population in the cell, sector, district or province level. 
Second, the seat includes nine elected judges, with seven sitting judges and two substitutes. And 
finally, the coordinating committee includes five of the nineteen elected judges who manage the 
administrative duties of the court. The Gacaca process begins when the seat creates a 
comprehensive list of every criminal act that falls under its subject and local jurisdiction. Then, 
each case is debated given information from general assembly testimonies and case file 
information. Based on the outcome of these debates, the seat issues a verdict, which can be 
appealed in a higher-level Gacaca court.  
 Each Gacaca level has different scopes of jurisdiction. For instance, at the sector and 
appeal level, Gacaca has jurisdiction in some category one and category two cases. There are 
currently 1,545 Gacaca courts of appeal at the sector level.14 The majority of category one cases 
                                                 
12 Uvin and Mironko. 
13 Ibid. Uvin and Mironko. 
14 Clark, Philip, Zachary D. Kaufman, and Phil Clark. "The Rules (and Politics) of Engagement: The Gacaca Courts and Post-Genocide Justice, 
Healing, and Reconciliation in Rwanda." After Genocide. New York: Columbia UP, 2009. Print. 
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fall under the jurisdiction of Rwandan domestic courts and the ICTR. Cell level Gacaca courts 
have primary jurisdiction in category three cases. Currently, there are 9,013 Gacaca courts at the 
cell level.15 Finally, all Gacaca appeal courts have jurisdiction to appeal cases from lower level 
courts.16 Within a discussion of criminal jurisdiction, it is also important to consider its punitive 
jurisdiction. For instance, the maximum punishment that Gacaca can sentence is 25 to 30 years’ 
imprisonment.17 If the accused perpetrator confesses before the trial, then the sentence is reduced 
to seven to twelve years’ imprisonment. For those who confess before the trial begins, there is an 
option to reduce the sentence to half prison term and half community service.  
 The Gacaca courts have five main objectives as established by the Rwandan 
government.18 The first goal is to reveal the truth about genocidal activities in 1994 through the 
collection of victim, witness, and perpetrator testimony. Next, the Gacaca courts aim to expedite 
the trial process by transferring genocide cases from the thirteen specialized Rwandan domestic 
courts to the 10,000 Gacaca courts. The third goal is to eradicate a culture of impunity in 
Rwanda by conducting public trials of genocide perpetrators so that such crimes do not go 
unpunished. Unlike most Western classical justice systems, Gacaca also strives to reconcile and 
strengthen unity among Rwandans. Finally, Gacaca aims to demonstrate that Rwanda is capable 
of solving its own problems. Overall, Gacaca’s principle goals are to reduce the backlog of cases 
in the Rwandan domestic court system and to also involve entire communities in the 
reconciliation and justice process.19 According to transitional justice expert Phil Clark, “The 
primary aim of Gacaca was not punishment alone but also reconciliation, seeking to restore a 
sense of social cohesion by facilitating a face to face resolution between victims and 
                                                 
15 “Gacaca Courts Process: Implementation and Achievements.” Kigali, Rwanda. 27 October 2010. Class presentation. 
16 Ibid. Clark and Kaufman.  
17 Clark and Kaufman.  
18 Ibid. Clark and Kaufman.  
19 Clark and Kaufman.  
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perpetrators.”20 The success and failure of the Gacaca court system ought to be measured against 
these established goals, as opposed to Western legal goals.  
 Many critiques of Gacaca frame their arguments around arbitrarily chosen goals that are 
not centered on these established mission statements. Instead, observers have criticized Gacaca 
from the assumption that it aims to embody formal, deterrent, and retributive methods of justice 
as found in Western classical justice systems. According to a 2002 Amnesty International report, 
for instance, “Gacaca trials need to conform to international standards of fairness so that the 
government’s efforts to end impunity…are effective.”21 Moreover, Human Rights Watch 
published a 2002 report highly critical of the Gacaca merits noting the failure to comply with 
international legal standards and instead rely heavily on a ‘therapeutic’ and reconciliatory 
paradigm of justice.22 Although these critiques merit consideration in the debate of Gacaca’s role 
in rebuilding Rwanda, they fail to capture the true driving purposes behind Gacaca. As opposed 
to acknowledging Gacaca as a force of restorative justice in which perpetrators can publicly 
confess, ask for forgiveness, and reenter communities, critics choose to center their arguments on 
the assumption that Gacaca ought to comply with international standards of justice.23 
 Many points of contention and controversy center on the latter assumption that Gacaca 
ought to adhere to international legal standards. For instance, one popular critique of the Gacaca 
courts is that the elected judges, inyangamugayo, are not impartial judges.24 During a group 
discussion with exiled Rwandans in Ugandan refugee camps, one Rwandan refugee cited this 
very argument, asking how justice can be fairly allocated if perpetrator guilt is presumed and the 
judges have been at times victims themselves. Although the Organic Law states that these judges 
                                                 
20 Ibid. Clark and Kaufman.  
21 Clark and Kaufman.  
22 Ibid. Clark and Kaufman.  
23 Clark and Kaufman.  
24 Ibid. Uvin and Mironko. 
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ought to be of high moral character and reputation within a given community, a discussion with 
Claude, a Gacaca evaluator revealed that these terms are not sufficiently defined.25 When asked 
what specific characteristics constitute integrity and morality, Claude argued that these terms 
were up to interpretation to the community population responsible for electing judges.26 Because 
the impartiality of popularly elected judges are in question, then it logically follows that the 
verdicts and sentences they issue are equally suspect. In a separate interview with Claude, he 
argued that appeals courts are able to effectively counter possible bias in Gacaca trials.27 But 
because the appeals courts also consist of popularly elected judges who are not technically legal 
professionals, the judgments may once again become subject to the same criticism.  
 Furthermore, another criticism of the Gacaca court system is that each trial could 
possibly regress to a method of mob justice in which victim communities overpower a possibly 
innocent defendant presumed to be guilty.28 According to some international legal critics, the 
popular involvement of entire communities may result in the sacrifice of individual rights for the 
sake of majority objectives.29 Moreover, the idea of a public forum does not always foster a 
sense of security or openness. For instance, in trials of rape or sexual violence, victims may not 
testify against perpetrators for fear of reprisal violence. In addition, speaking publicly about such 
crimes is not generally practiced in Rwandan society. For these reasons, crimes of a sexual 
nature are generally tried within the Rwandan domestic court system. But that is not to say that a 
similar argument could be made for surviving family members of other crimes. For instance, 
witnesses to a certain crime may fear similar retaliation by accused perpetrators. Both Gacaca 
courts and the ICTR have failed to adequately address the matter of sufficient witness protection.  
                                                 
25 Claude. Personal interview. 10 Nov. 2010. 
26Ibid. Claude.  
27 Claude.  
28 Ibid. Clark and Kaufman.  
29 Clark and Kaufman.  
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On the other hand, legal scholars have identified that the real problem within the Gacaca 
system is the lack of community participation.30 In a system that is based on popular involvement 
for popular legitimacy, Gacaca should require not discourage community involvement. As Clark 
argued, “the main challenge currently facing Gacaca is not too much engagement (in the form of 
mob justice)…but rather too little engagement in the daily operation of hearings.”31 In some rural 
areas, trials have been postponed or altogether cancelled due to a lack of community 
participation and attendance.32 
 Lastly, many argue that Gacaca fails to adequately serve justice due to the lenient 
punishments, where sentences cannot exceed 30 years’ imprisonment, and can be reduced to half 
with pre-trial confession and community service. However, punishment is not the sole focus of 
Gacaca courts. Instead, it aims to reconcile perpetrators with victims and their families through 
public discourse centered on truth telling, understanding, and reintegration. For instance, Clark 
argues, “Punishing the guilty may contribute partially to fulfilling some of the populations’ 
needs, but overall it is, on its own, an insufficient response.”33 
Despite this deluge of criticisms, Gacaca has many notable merits, which lie in 
opposition to a number of these complaints. For instance, Gacaca courts are centered on popular 
participation to foster a community dialogue for greater efforts of reconciliation and justice. An 
interesting outcome of this spirit of community involvement has been the creation of a public 
forum for women’s empowerment. In traditional Gacaca, women were forbidden from serving 
                                                 
30 Ibid. Clark and Kaufman.  
31 Clark and Kaufman.  
32 Ibid. Clark and Kaufman.  
33 Clark and Kaufman.  
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as judges or providing testimonies. But in today’s Gacaca, women have found a strong voice in 
their communities by offering testimony and issuing verdicts.34  
Moreover, although a punitive focus may comply with international legal standards, they 
do not sufficiently address the greater issues at hand of rebuilding a fractured society and 
mending broken relationships. Clark argues, “The ethos of Gacaca holds that there can be no 
reconciliation without genuine engagement between parties previously in conflict.”35 In response 
to the challenges and criticisms Gacaca faces, Claude cited that their primary focus was to 
complete “good work.”36 He said, “For me I am happy we have really done very good work…we 
are not taking any side. Be it on the side of the victims or the side of the defendants…we are 
supposed to be impartial and we think this is when we can show what is supposed to be seen.”37 
In Claude’s view, it is clear that “good work” consists of impartiality, an issue that appears to be 
in contention through different interpretations.38 
But, perhaps the most significant success of the Gacaca courts has been its ability to 
dramatically reduce the case backlog in the formal Rwandan judiciary. According to Peter Uvin 
of the Fletcher School at Tufts University and Charles Mironko, of the Watson Institute for 
International Studies at Brown University, “the strongest element in favor of Gacaca is the lack 
of an alternative. Neither the ICTR nor the formal justice system seems capable of providing the 
basis for justice or reconciliation in Rwanda.”39 Despite initial opposition, the international 
community soon came to the same conclusion that “if done well, Gacaca could produce results 
superior to the formal justice system.”40  
                                                 
34 Ibid. Clark and Kaufman.  
35 Clark and Kaufman 
36 Ibid. Claude.  
37Claude.  
38 Ibid. Claude. 
39 Ibid. Uvin and Mironko. 
40 Uvin and Mironko 
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 It is evident that major points of contention within these academic debates center on 
aspects of the trial process, final judgment, and punishments. In Gacaca courts, Western critics 
cite judge partiality, lack of counsel, potential mob justice, and lenient punishments as evidence 
of inadequate justice. Implied within these arguments are specific judicial values, which reappear 
in the project objectives and indicators of international development partners and the Rwandan 
government. For instance, indicators of both development partners and government institutions 
place high value on the legal competence of judges, measured by the amount and quality of 
training. Accordingly, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) through the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) funds a number of projects on training 
Rwandan judges and prosecutors. The role of these judicial values in the interaction between 
development partners and government institutions will be discussed in greater detail in the 
Analysis and Findings section. 
Overall, the Gacaca courts have shown that Rwanda is capable of solving its own 
problems through an innovative new system of justice. In this hybrid model that draws from 
elements of a war crime tribunal, truth commission and traditional system, Gacaca has expanded 
the objective focus from justice to reconciliation. According to Claude, “All of these objectives 
have been attained to a certain degree.”41 Once the remaining cases are completed, Gacaca will 
transfer any remaining unheard cases back to the Rwandan domestic courts. If one judges 
Gacaca’s success from a Western-specific standpoint, then Gacaca fails to meet acceptable legal 
standards of impartiality and proper punishment. But, if one judges its success based on its own 
goals, then Gacaca has undoubtedly played a major role in rebuilding Rwandan society by 
mending broken relationships and actively involving communities in the process. 
                                                 
41 Ibid. Claude. 
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The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 Established on November 8, 1994 through United Nations (UN) Security Council 
Resolution 955, the ICTR has played a significant role in the development of international law.42 
The tribunal was established to address the genocide and other crimes against humanity in 
Rwanda and surrounding provinces between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.43 This 
limiting jurisdiction became a source of tension among Rwandans and outside observers. The 
ICTR comprises four chambers, three of which hear trials and another hears appeals.44 There are 
sixteen total judges in the four chambers, and an additional nine ad litem judges.45 The ICTR 
also consists of the Office of the Prosecutor, which is divided into the Investigation Section and 
the Prosecution Section.46 The former is responsible for evidence and information gathering, 
whereas the latter section is responsible for prosecuting the cases that appear before the 
Tribunal.47 
Originally, the Rwandan government was in full support of an international tribunal 
citing four major reasons.48 The first of which included the belief in upholding universal human 
rights by punishing genocide.49 Secondly, the Rwandan government thought it would be better 
able to avoid vengeful justice with relatively impartial international assistance.50 Next, the 
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Rwandan government believed a tribunal would end a culture of impunity.51 Finally, an 
international tribunal would assist Rwanda in capturing exiled perpetrators.52  
Despite this initial support, Rwanda was the only UN member state to vote against the 
establishment of the ICTR. It voted against the resolution for seven specific reasons, which to 
some extent remain relevant in popular opinions of the ICTR today. First, the Rwandan 
government believed that the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal from January 1, 1994 to 
December 31, 1994 was too limiting in that it failed to consider the planning stages of 
genocide.53 Moreover, it argued that the jurisdiction ignored the root causes of the genocide.54 A 
Rwandan representative, for instance, argued that a tribunal “which refuses to consider the 
causes of the genocide in Rwanda and its planning…cannot be of any use…because it will not 
contribute to eradicating the culture of impunity or creating a climate conducive to national 
reconciliation.”55 Furthermore, the Rwandan government argued that the composition and 
structure of the proposed tribunal was inadequate and ill prepared to manage such a large 
caseload.56 It argued to increase the number of Trial Chamber judges and provide its own 
Appeals Chamber and prosecutor.57 
 The third reason of dissent was concern over the differing levels of indictments and a 
skewed focus on killers versus planners. However, in response the first prosecutor Richard 
Goldstone stated his primary objective was to “bring to justice those most responsible both at a 
national and local level.”58 Next, the Rwandan government opposed the involvement of certain 
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countries in tribunal matters given their active role in the Rwandan civil war.59 There was also 
disagreement over the levels of punishment whereby the death penalty could not be issued 
through the tribunal and concerns over imprisoning convicted Rwandans outside of Rwanda.60 
Finally, the Rwandan government opposed not accommodating the tribunal on Rwandan soil, but 
instead in Arusha, Tanzania.61  
During an interview with Claude, many of these concerns were highlighted as areas of 
disagreement with the ICTR. For instance, he cited the numerous difficulties that arise from not 
basing a court in the location of the crime. Therefore, according to Claude, the fact that the ICTR 
is outside Rwanda remains to be a contentious element that works in opposition to 
“reconciliation objectives.”62 As an evaluator of the Gacaca system, he said,  
“Because the [Gacaca] courts are deeply rooted in the grassroots…that is the main point that 
makes it different from ICTR. The judges in Arusha have not even met judges here. There is more 
evidence when on site. All these are important to get a fair trial and get people reconciled.”63  
Another area of disagreement he voiced, that is shared by many other Rwandans and 
international observers, is the excessive amount of time and money spent on individual 
ICTR cases. For instance, Claude argued, “At least for us in Gacaca courts, we have been 
cost effective.”64 Unlike Gacaca, however, the ICTR has spent millions of dollars in 
prosecuting less than one hundred perpetrators.65 Vincent, an individual working in the 
Rwandan Supreme Court, asked, “How can you weigh the costs that have been spent on 
those cases?”66 Uvin and Mironko, for instance, argue, “the tribunal has produced 
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remarkably little: by early 2002, with 800 employees and after having spent 
approximately U.S. $540 million, it had handed down eight convictions and one acquittal, 
with seven trials for seventeen accused in progress, two appeals pending, and fifty-five 
suspects in the tribunal’s custody.”67 
 The ICTR is clearly unable to achieve all the transitional justice needs of Rwanda. 
Although its statute states that the tribunal is meant to promote peace and reconciliation 
through the trial process, it is not an adequate or sufficient method of reconciliation in 
Rwanda. This is largely due to its remoteness from the Rwandan population, 
overwhelmingly negative local perceptions of the tribunal, and its inherent inability to 
foster meaningful dialogue through an adversarial trial process.  According to former 
ICTR prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow, the tribunal is by no means a “panacea for post-
genocide Rwanda.”68 
Overall, critics of the ICTR share a general mistrust of international involvement 
in post-genocide Rwanda when that same community ignored the genocide as it occurred. 
According to one scholarly interpretation, the establishment of the ICTR is therefore 
indicative of a projection of collective international guilt, in which the international 
community seeks consolation through active post-conflict involvement.69 According 
Uvin and Mironko, the ICTR serves as, “reaffirmation of the international community’s 
own morality.70 Instead of having a genuine focus on reconciliation and justice, the ICTR 
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“is about symbolic politics: we, the international community, do care about Rwanda, are 
outraged by it, and solemnly pledge to show our disapproval.”71 
 In the face of overwhelming criticism, ICTR officials have projected extremely 
sanguine interpretations of the institution’s success. According to Jallow, the ICTR 
played a major role in promoting international cooperation, which in turn bolstered the 
success of the ICTR.72 He argues that the establishment of the tribunal sent a message 
that “the international community was not only aware of the violence committed in 
Rwanda and neighboring states, but willing to take action and hold those responsible to 
account.”73 Moreover, he argues that the trials act as a form of reconciliation through the 
truth-telling process inherent in formal trials. In Resolution 955, the stated objectives of 
the tribunal include “[contributing] to the process of national reconciliation and to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace.”74 Furthermore, Jallow praises the ICTR as a 
successful mechanism of retributive justice that serves as a deterrent.75 While he 
acknowledges that retributive justice is not enough, he admits that alternatives are not 
within ICTR jurisdiction.76  
 This largely optimistic view of the ICTR is undoubtedly due to his role as the 
ICTR prosecutor. But it nevertheless lends valuable insight into some of the perceived 
achievements and advantages of the tribunal. For instance, he praises the ICTR for 
having established a clear definition of genocide, recognizing print and media sources as 
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culpable in inciting genocide, clarifying details of the Geneva Convention and finally 
debunking the myth of sovereign immunity from crimes against humanity.77  
Some argue that the establishment of the ICTR has been a major milestone in the 
advancement of international law in terms of “replacing a culture of impunity with one of 
accountability.”78 By convicting key masterminds, such as Georges Rutaganda and 
Laurent Semanza, the ICTR “has once again blazed a trail in international criminal law,” 
according to Jallow.79 However, these achievements may be merely ostensible, 
considering the overwhelming inefficiencies, drawbacks, and controversies. Unlike 
certain criticisms of Gacaca, the aforementioned assessments of the ICTR are legitimate 
since they are founded in international legal standards. The fact that the ICTR fails to 
adhere to these legal standards through sufficient witness protection, cost efficiency, and 
expedient proceedings, the largely negative evaluation of ICTR success is a fair 
assessment. Established as a formal system of deterrent justice, the ICTR fails to present 
a serious threat to potential violators of international criminal law. As Uvin and Mironko 
argue, “it will take a lot more than nine persons convicted in eight years to deter future 
bloodshed in the region.”80 
Once again, key judicial values emerge from these arguments for and against the 
ICTR. First, it is apparent from the stance of the Rwandan government, that physical 
proximity and general civilian awareness of court proceedings are important to 
establishing legitimacy. This judicial value is evident in Rwandan justice sector reform, 
where one of the major targets is providing universal access to justice. Moreover, cost 
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efficiency is another important value guiding one of the major critiques of the ICTR. The 
ability of Gacaca courts and Rwandan domestic courts to process cases significantly 
faster than the ICTR, is perhaps reflective of budget restraints on a developing nation. 
Lastly, criticisms of bureaucratic infighting and inefficiency demonstrate the importance 
of speedy trials, which are also reflected in justice sector reform indicators. The judicial 
values stemming from arguments surrounding the ICTR yield valuable insight into key 
themes guiding the monitoring and evaluation of progress in justice sector reform.  
 
Justice Sector Reform 
Western judicial ideals and Rwandan judicial ideals intersect in the space of 
justice sector reform. Through the involvement of international development partners and 
Rwandan governmental institutions, these values sometimes overlap and sometimes 
diverge. Before delving into a thorough analysis of this process, this section aims to 
provide a factual backdrop to the forthcoming arguments. The Rwandan justice sector, 
formally known as the Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order (JRLO) sector, comprises 
fourteen government institutions and other partner organizations. This includes the 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the judiciary, Institute of Legal Practice 
and Development, Military Courts, Military Prosecution Service, National Commission 
for Human Rights, National Police Service, National Prison Services, National Public 
Prosecution Authority, National Service of Gacaca Courts, National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission, Ombudsman, and TIG.81  
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The JRLO Sector Strategy of 2009 to 2012 is a key component of the Rwandan 
government’s Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) 
Governance Flagship Program. The goal of the EDPRS is to promote “sustainable 
economic growth and social development,” with the stated purpose of “[strengthening] 
the rule of law to promote good governance and a culture of peace.”82 The JRLO Sector 
Strategy fits within these government objectives.  
 In the years since 1994, the Rwandan justice sector has drastically improved. 
Immediately after the genocide, many believed that without a functioning judiciary, adequate 
justice could never be achieved. For instance, Ian Martin, former secretary-general of Amnesty 
International and the chief of the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda spoke of “the 
impossibility of justice” in post-genocide Rwanda.83 According to Uvin and Mironko, “what was 
being attempted was not the reconstruction, but rather the first-time construction of a fair, 
efficient, and human rights-based justice system that combats impunity.”84 
Despite these pessimistic views, the justice sector nevertheless developed as a result of 
active international involvement and strong government leadership. According to the JRLO 
Sector Strategy, for instance, “Security and peace have been restored; mechanisms have been put 
in place to build reconciliation and national unity; the rule of law has been strengthened; and 
huge strides have been made in modernizing the country’s justice system.”85 The results of a 
recent EDPRS survey indicated the favorable view many Rwandans held of the justice sector.86 
For example, 72 percent of respondents considered that the justice situation was acceptable in 
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their cell.87 Similarly, 80 percent of respondents rated the performance of courts as good or very 
good.88 Lastly, 67 percent of business owners believed that the court system is “fair/impartial and 
uncorrupted.”89 These achievements are especially significant when considering recent 
conditions. In 1994, Rwanda only had 32 judges and 18 prosecutors with law degrees.90 At the 
recent Policy Dialogue on Legislative Reform, the Minister of Justice, Tharcisse Karugarama, 
said, “We have made remarkable progress, but we still have much farther to go.”91  
Currently, the JRLO faces a number of challenges in promoting justice, peace and 
reconciliation at community levels. According to the JRLO Sector Strategy, the process of 
reconciliation continues in the face of recurring genocide ideology. Moreover, the justice process 
remains unaffordable and inaccessible to the average Rwandan. According to a study conducted 
by the Legal Aid Forum, the average cost of judgment for litigants is approximately six times the 
average monthly income, which inevitably results in significant debt and further 
impoverishment.92 Overall, the issue of equitable and affordable access to justice remains a 
major issue for the average Rwandan.       
To target these issues, the JRLO established a Sector Strategy from 2009 to 2012 that 
includes four main expected outputs, twelve main targets, and twenty indicators.93 The first 
expected output is achieving universal access to quality justice. This output incorporates five 
main targets including access to legal advice and representation, satisfaction with Abunzi justice, 
eliminating case backlog, reducing case processing time, and decreasing costs for enforcing 
commercial contracts. Almost half of the total indicators fall under this first output, thereby 
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demonstrating the diversity of assessment and the level of importance of achieving universal 
access to justice. The second output is eradicating genocide ideology and reinforcing 
reconciliation mechanisms. Falling under this output are targets to complete TIG work camps, 
achieve high levels of trust and reconciliation among Rwandans, and finalize Gacaca genocide 
cases.  
The third output is promoting the rule of law, accountability and human rights. This 
includes achieving high levels of public confidence in JRLO institutions and the rule of law, 
ratifying all international human rights instruments, and operating prisons within their planned 
capacity. The final output is maintaining and enhancing safety, law, and order, which includes 
the sole target of reducing the reported and perceived crime levels. Each of the outputs includes 
at least one measure of public perception of government progress. Another important trend 
within the indicators is the high value placed on reconciliation as another goal along the route to 
justice. Finally, the strategy acknowledges the importance of upholding international human 
rights instruments, revealing the accepted influence of international actors in domestic policy.  
The JRLO Sector Strategy places a strong emphasis on collaboration within the sector 
through an objective known as the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp).94 Therefore, the JRLO 
provides a strategic framework for all fourteen institutions within the justice sector. However, 
this paper specifically focuses on one of those institutions, the judiciary. The judiciary includes 
the Supreme Court, the High Court of the Republic, the Commercial High Court, Higher 
Instance Courts, Commercial Courts, and Lower Instance Courts.95 Encompassed within the 
sector wide JRLO, these courts share a separate but overlapping strategy that also includes four 
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key objectives.  The first strategic objective of the judiciary is to ensure that justice is fully 
accessible to the people of Rwanda. Secondly, the judiciary aims to ensure that justice is 
administered fairly, effectively, and efficiently. The third objective is to strengthen the 
independence of the judiciary to boost confidence in the adjudication process. Lastly, the fourth 
objective is to engage in effective collaboration with justice partners in accordance with SWAp.  
Overall, there are twelve international development partners involved with the justice 
sector.96 This research will focus on USAID, EC, and a European NGO. First, USAID through 
the MCC Threshold Program has five projects working toward political rights, civil liberties, and 
voice and accountability.97 These indicators fall under the MCC framework for ruling justly that 
includes judiciary capacity building and legislative reform. Next, the EC operates under a sector 
wide budget support approach, in which funding is allocated to all fourteen government 
institutions.98 It aims to strengthen the law enforcement system and reinforce the legal system. 
For instance, its targets include a reduction in case backlog by 50% from the 2006 baseline, 
circulation of information on existing laws, and continued training of legal authorities.99 Finally, 
the European NGO carries out projects in reducing case backlog in the judiciary, training 
Abunzi, and measuring baselines through an Abunzi monitoring project.100 
These development partners are critical to the progress of the Rwandan justice sector. 
This paper seeks to answer whether the same judicial values that guided debates between the 
Rwandan government and international actors over Gacaca and the ICTR similarly guide 
interactions between Rwandan government institutions and the international development 
partners.  
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Analysis and Findings 
 
 Justice sector reform is indeed a space of contention. But, it is not the result of differing 
judicial values. Instead, a variety of factors come into play involving all the development 
partners, civil society, and government institutions. For instance, the political whims of the 
Rwandan government and the donor countries’ governments impose specific constraints that 
may work in counter to certain objectives of the other parties. The institutions involved in justice 
sector reform also face a number of technical challenges including limited staff and resources as 
well as gathering and receiving data in a timely fashion. Overall, each institution shares the same 
guiding judicial values. Individuals working for Rwandan government institutions reportedly 
value international legal standards in high regard. Véronique, an individual working for the 
Ministry of Finance, stated that there are certainly some elements “that should be at international 
respectable norms.”101 Likewise, individuals in development partner agencies claim to take 
Rwanda’s unique circumstances into consideration when evaluating progress.102 While the 
guiding judicial values may be the same, the order in which each actor values them varies 
significantly. As a result, the different prioritizations of judicial values within justice sector 
reform are a key source of tension. Unlike the debates between the Rwandan government and the 
international community over Gacaca and the ICTR, debates within justice sector reform center 
around different challenges.  
 Foreign critics of Gacaca and Rwandan critics of the ICTR had notably different visions 
of what justice should be in each system. Their visions, however, clashed with the ultimate 
objectives of each institution. For instance, the goals of Gacaca included not only justice, but 
also reconciliation, a major source of misunderstanding among its foreign critics. On the other 
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hand, the ICTR was an instrument of formal international justice that did not aim to reconcile 
Rwandans or compensate victims. Most Rwandan critics of the ICTR, however, evaluated the 
success of the tribunal on this basis. Therefore, if critics use evaluative baselines that are 
different from the key objectives of each institution, critics will inevitably form negative 
perceptions of that institution. In this case, the use of different evaluative baselines was the 
upshot of different judicial values. In the Rwandan justice sector, however, this is not the case. 
The Rwandan government and its international development partners share a willingness to 
reform the justice sector to internationally accepted standards.  
 In the article, “Western and Local Approaches to Justice,” Uvin and Mironko describe 
the unique relationship between donors and the Rwandan government in the justice sector.  
“For donors, similarly, administrative success is often measured in outputs. Have the promised 
number of judges been trained? Have the laws been written in conformity with international 
standards? Have the computers been installed and personnel trained? To recipients, substantive 
outcomes matter, and these only begin where administrative outputs end. At best, the formal 
markers of success for donors are only the building blocks for the recipients. At worst, they are 
largely irrelevant, mattering only insofar as they create tangible benefits for those people who 
actually get the salaries, computers, and per diems” 103 
While many indicators used by development partners certainly include the numbers of computers 
installed or personnel trained, individuals working for development partner institutions expressed 
another concern. For example, Alfred and Philip both argued in favor of more qualitative 
indicators to gauge popular perceptions of their work.104 In fact, Philip criticized the Rwandan 
government its exclusive reliance on quantitative data in its monitoring and evaluation 
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framework.105 According to Rwandan government officials, the “building blocks” of trainings, 
workshops, and basic materials are certainly crucial components of sector capacity building. For 
instance, Veronique emphasized the importance of substantive training for legal professionals to 
eventually achieve greater judiciary independence. Unlike the rigid dichotomy that Uvin and 
Mironko present, the reality is much less defined with development partners and government 
officials working toward the same goals.       
Tension within the justice sector, therefore, does not arise from separate judicial values. 
Instead, it arises from the different ranking order of judicial values in each institution. For 
instance, the Rwandan government claims that the independence of the judiciary is a key 
strategic objective.106 However, according to critical development partners, the government is 
not working hard enough to achieve this goal.107 On the surface, each actor claims to share the 
same visions of reform. The actions of each actor below the surface are another matter entirely.  
 
Development Partners 
 The development partners involved with the Rwandan judiciary include the UNDP, 
USAID, ICF, EC, the Netherlands, Belgium, and around thirty NGOs. Each organization has its 
own listed goals and priorities. USAID, for instance, has its own interpretation of the justice 
sector that includes the Parliament, although it is not included in the formal JRLO. Moreover, 
UNDP, USAID, and the ICF fund specific projects, whereas the EC, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands use a budget sector approach. This means that funds go to the entire justice sector 
and are then divided amongst the different government institutions. According to Alfred, an 
                                                 
105 Ibid. Philip.  
106 Republic of Rwanda. Strategic Plan of the Judiciary 2008-2012. Kigali. Supreme Court. July 2008. Web. 15 Nov. 2010. 
<www.minijust.gov.rw> 
107 Ibid. Philip.  
 34 
individual representing the EC, this approach is “far more holistic,” in considering the multitude 
of different projects and institutions involved in the sector.108 Despite its different strategies, the 
development partners have similar overlapping goals including training professionals, 
institutional capacity building, and increasing universal access to justice. Most development 
partner representatives argued that it is not their goal to influence government policies or drive a 
specific political agenda.109 But rather, their goal is to help government institutions achieve the 
defined objectives.   
 According to Matthew, a representative of USAID, the Kigali team is limited by the 
constraints imposed by their headquarters in Washington D.C.110 Matthew highlighted the 
limitations of using donor funds that have “strings attached to American taxpayers’ dollars.”111 
Therefore, outside criticism of the limited scope of USAID projects fail to consider the domestic 
restrictions imposed on project leaders. Moreover, several individuals working for different 
international development institutions claimed to have harmonized and aligned considerably with 
government objectives.112 For instance, Philip, an individual working for an NGO involved in 
projects in the judiciary, stated that, “what we do happens to align almost a hundred percent with 
a number of the Ministry’s objectives.”113 While development partners claim to have fully 
aligned themselves with government goals, individuals working for government institutions 
disagree.114  
 While some government officials hold negative views of certain development partners, 
individuals within these international organizations similarly hold negative views of other 
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development partners. For instance, Philip was highly critical of USAID projects, in that they 
failed to align themselves in anyway with government initiatives.115 The structure of USAID and 
MCC projects use the same three indicators worldwide and form projects through a contract with 
the host government.116 However, in many cases, the projects are not specifically tailored to 
align with the governmental infrastructure or objectives. Moreover, other individuals were 
critical of their own institutions, arguing that development partners in general were not 
effectively advocating their own goals.117 For instance, one NGO official argued, “If anything, 
the development partners are too uncritical and they’re not pushing [the Rwandan government] 
hard enough.”118 
 With regard to foreign opinions of Rwandan government institutions, most research 
participants emphasized the government’s willingness to reform. However, a few individuals 
also highlighted that this willingness only existed provided that there were no political 
repercussions.119 Mark, a USAID representative, argued that the Rwandan government was 
generally eager to reform its judiciary, but only to the extent that the reforms were aligned with 
its political agenda.120 According to Mark, “[The government is] not going to risk the possibility 
of creating hate speech or doubt about the genocide, or both. And if that costs [them] these goals, 
that otherwise [they] were willing to achieve, so be it.”121 On the whole, individuals working for 
development partners had positive opinions about the Rwandan government, asserting that 
government officials are “hard-working,” “goal oriented,” and “extremely driven.”122  
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 Mark also argued that their relationship with some government institutions is “stellar,” 
but highlighted their strained relations with others.123 Perceptions surrounding the Rwandan 
government largely portray it as a strong negotiator, able to “get exactly what it wants.”124 In 
terms of establishing project objectives, monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and 
development strategy, the government is seen as a resolute body, certain of its own goals. 
According to Matthew of USAID, “The JRLO is a sector that knows what it wants.”125 This 
certainty of its objectives is perhaps one underlying reason behind perceptions that the 
government is also uncooperative. 
 According to Mark, the government is extremely unhelpful once it comes to changing 
government policies to achieve better justice sector outcomes.126 For instance, one of the key 
targets of the MCC Justice Strengthening Project is to train legal professionals in proper legal 
drafting that makes laws easier to understand. The guiding principle behind this objective is that 
clearly defined law allows for clearly applied law. However, Rwandan legal drafters hesitate to 
clearly define terms, such as “genocide ideology,” or “hate speech.”127 Mark perceived this to be 
a sign of intransigence, in which the Rwandan government refuses to fully reform its systems 
once it strikes political chords.128 He also perceived a certain resistance toward foreigners, who 
“simply don’t understand Rwandan problems.”129 However, individuals working for other 
development partners did not perceive a general mistrust of foreigners to be the reason for the 
lack of cooperation.130 
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 Instead, Philip claimed that the majority of middle-ranking government officials “didn’t 
know how the sector works.”131 Moreover, others claimed that a culturally rooted “fear of being 
a decision maker,” prevents most government officials from taking decisive steps in reform 
projects.132 While this is only one individual’s opinion, it was echoed in other sentiments 
highlighting the common government problem in referring political issues to higher-ranking 
officials. This sidestepping of responsibility in politically charged cases speaks to the limits of 
the Rwandan government in exercising reform in the justice sector. As Philip stated, “Who is the 
government of Rwanda? The government is closely linked with justice, it’s the President, it’s the 
Supreme Court, and different institutions that don’t necessarily have the same interests…”133 
Mark argued that the government of Rwanda should not have the ability to decide which reforms 
to undertake and which to forgo, since they are not providing the funding.134 So, while the 
government might not explicitly state that it doesn’t support clearly defining genocide ideology, 
it will simply make the process more difficult thereby revealing its different priorities.  
 Individuals in development partner organizations revealed strong opinions surrounding 
the strategy and the indicators used to measure progress. For instance, Philip argued that the 
important issues of the justice sector are not present in the current JRLO Sector Strategy.135 For 
instance, he argued that the current sector strategy did not include objectives measuring the 
independence of the judiciary or the treatment of prisoners.136 While these are major concerns of 
development partners and NGOs with a human rights focus, they are not necessarily the primary 
objectives of the government. In fact, one government representative within the JRLO Secretariat 
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mentioned that development partners are coming up with new, politicized indicators that should 
not belong in the sector.137  
However, according to Philip, government officials will not explicitly state that it is not 
in favor of such goals.138 For instance, he stated, “The government will never say to you, that no 
we don’t want political rights. They will say to you that yes we are very much in favor of them, 
but they have different ideas about them and how to implement them.”139 Some development 
partners clearly sense tension with the government in this area of establishing sector strategies. 
The objectives and indicators of the JRLO were established in consultation with all development 
partners and NGOs. Yet, individuals working for development partner organizations do not 
believe that their governments have pushed their own agenda and priorities hard enough.140  
For instance, Philip argued that international NGOs were required to align completely 
with government objectives in order to set up an office in Rwanda.141 Without complete 
harmonization, prospective NGOs would not be able to find a place for themselves. This pressure 
to perfectly align with government initiatives is perceived to be a negative consequence of donor 
alignment strategies set out by donor frameworks like the Paris Declaration of 2005, which 
prioritizes alignment and harmonization as two of the five guiding principles.142  Despite its 
conventional backing, this perceived pressure is regarded as a hindrance to goals that may not 
appear in the final strategy. For this reason, the NGO’s focus on human rights conditions within 
the justice sector are largely ignored in the government’s eyes since they do not appear in the 
sector strategy.143   
                                                 
137 Ibid. Jean-Paul.   
138 Ibid. Philip.  
139 Philip.  
140 Ibid. Philip.  
141 Philip.  
142 Ibid. Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period 2008—2013.  
143 Ibid. Jean-Paul.  
 39 
Regarding the indicators used within JRLO assessments, Matthew of USAID believed 
that its monitoring and evaluation framework is purposely designed to strictly present the JRLO 
in a positive light.144 Because the government received largely negative assessments by the 
standards of international indicators such as Freedom House or the World Bank, the JRLO 
purportedly established its own evaluation framework through the sector strategy to combat these 
negative reviews.145 On the other hand, Philip stated that such a view failed to consider the 
minimal experience and education of most Rwandan government officials forming the 
strategy.146 He stated, “So, to think that they…somehow purposely created this system to only 
make it give nice impressions about Rwanda, seems to me that you’re giving them a lot of 
credit.”147  
Another commonly held view among the interviewed development partner 
representatives was that the JRLO indicators were heavily quantitative. According to a highly 
critical official, “Quantitative is too big a word to use for counting the number of prisons built. 
You can do that on one hand.”148 The JRLO indicators are heavily dependent upon statistical 
quantifications of progress within the sector.149 For instance, fourteen of the twenty indicators 
rely upon numerical assessments of progress, including number of ratified human rights 
instruments, the number of prisoners awaiting trial, and the number of prisoners as a percentage 
of planned jail capacity.150 Alfred of the EC stated, “It’s very difficult to assess with this kind of 
                                                 
144 Ibid. Matthew.  
145 Matthew.  
146 Ibid. Philip.  
147 Philip.  
148 Ibid. Philip.  
149 Ibid. JRLO Sector Strategy 2009 to 2012. 
150 JRLO Sector Strategy 2009 to 2012. 
 40 
sector. With infrastructure, there’s the number of kilometers of roads. It’s easy. But with justice, 
[the indicators] are something that still need to be improved.”151 
While the quantitative evaluations may be necessary indicators of progress, they should 
also be paired equally with perception-based studies. Currently, the Ministry of Local 
Government, Community Development, and Social Affairs (MINALOC) published the only 
perception-based study available on popular opinions of the Rwandan judiciary.152 Moreover, 
there is now a JRLO Secretariat initiative to release a perception-based study of JRLO 
government institutions by the end of next year.153 Although this is an important initiative, some 
individuals believed this should have been completed before establishing indicators in order to 
create a proper baseline.154  
Another criticism of the sector is the difficulty in gathering and transmitting data in a 
timely fashion. It is difficult, according to a number of development partner representatives, to 
promptly receive information from government institutions. For instance, Mark claimed that this 
was the result of a certain cultural reticence to share information easily.155 While this is perhaps 
founded in nothing more than personal observation, this was a commonly cited reason for the 
restricted flow of information within the justice sector. Another individual, for instance, claimed, 
“communication is not really a trait that is Rwandese.”156 These comments of course, while 
objectively unfounded, are nevertheless centered on a perception that it is difficult to extract 
information from the Rwandan government. Alfred, for example, was quick to point out that this 
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problem also exists on the development partners’ side, with reports released months after their 
expected date.157  
Overall, the interviewed representatives of international development partner 
organizations largely agreed that the government is willing to reform.158 They also shared the 
view that government institutions were generally easy to work alongside. However, several 
individuals pointed out the difficulty in advancing projects with government stalemates 
regarding certain political issues.159 Some of these issues included legal drafting of laws 
concerning genocide ideology and issues concerning the independence of the judiciary. Clearly, 
these political issues are underlying causes of tension within the justice sector. Despite these 
shortcomings, most agreed that all stakeholders needed to work collaboratively to have a 
functioning sector. Moreover, most development partners did not believe that challenges in the 
justice sector arose from differing visions of justice.  
Instead, most individuals attributed challenges to some other cause. For instance, Philip 
argued, “We have not had the same experiences as they have…so, we’re bound to have different 
views in these things.”160 Moreover, Alfred stated, “We don’t always give the same priorities to 
different values…and obviously our assessment is not always the same, but with the sector, the 
bottom line is that we have to work together.”161 While there is agreement that government 
institutions and development partners share willingness to reform, the exact approach of reform 
is a matter of contention among the different parties. This does not, however, indicate radically 
different judicial values on either side. Rather, it demonstrates the diversity of opinions and 
priorities among the different actors involved.  
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Government Institutions 
 The JRLO is a thriving sector that has made a number of improvements over the years. 
Through a variety of projects with its development partners, the sector has built capacity in 
almost all of its institutions. In the judiciary, training judges and reducing case backlog are key 
targets.162 According to Oliver, an official in the Supreme Court, the main priority of the 
Supreme Court is to “do the right thing at the right time,” thereby placing an emphasis on case 
backlog reduction.163 Another important objective of the judiciary is capacity building among the 
judges and prosecutors. MCC, for instance, has led training workshops on judgment writing for 
Rwandan judges. According to another Rwandan government official, Véronique, the key to an 
independent judiciary is “independence of the mind.”164 In other words, before achieving a 
strong independent judiciary, the judges need to have a strong educational background. Another 
aim of training judges is to develop a common understanding of the law across the country. 
Overall, the priorities of the judiciary involve improving the basic training of judges to handle 
the existing case backlog and prepare for incoming cases.165 
 According to Jean-Paul, a representative of the JRLO Secretariat, the justice sector in 
Rwanda is the most advanced justice sector in East Africa.166 With the Gacaca courts, Rwanda 
proved that it was able to solve its own unique problems.167 Therefore, in the arena of justice 
sector reform, development partners realized Rwanda was “in a better position to cure [its] own 
illness.”168 As a result, JRLO government institutions have a strong influence with development 
partners in project management. For instance, Oliver stated, “The development partners don’t 
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come with activities to impose on the Supreme Court. It’s what the Supreme Court plans.”169 
Individuals in both development partner organizations and government institutions perceive a 
high level of government control in justice sector reform.  
 The judiciary faces a number of challenges in implementing its reforms. First, by taking 
judges and prosecutors out of court to undergo training, courts are unable to run at full 
capacity.170 Limited staff in the judiciary is a significant issue in reducing case backlog and 
finding replacements during trainings. Furthermore, the judiciary also faces difficulties in finding 
Rwandan locals with adequate skills to provide training to local judges and prosecutors.171 
Although, international development partners willingly provide foreign trainers for workshops, 
several Rwandan individuals expressed the importance of having trainers who understand 
Rwanda’s unique political and historical context.172 For instance, Véronique stated, “We try as 
much as possible to get someone from the region who…understands the context of the 
region.”173  
 According to government officials, the goals and priorities of the development partners 
vary slightly. For instance, according to Jean-Paul, development partners regard their projects as 
a political showcase, where partners strive to become a co-chair or silent co-chair of a sector.174 
“It’s on that level, where they try to align and harmonize,” he said.175 Moreover, while 
development partners are required to present their project size and funding information to the 
JRLO Secretariat for budgeting purposes, many do not or delay the process. Jean-Paul interprets 
this hesitancy to disclose budgeting information as a fear of losing one’s place in the sector. 
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Because many development partners aim to reduce project size through alignment, a growing 
budget would indicate failure to reach those goals. As a result, headquarters might reduce the 
budgets of offices operating on the ground. The majority of Rwandan government officials 
agreed that most development partners are willing to reform, but show resistance in certain 
situations.  
Likewise, the Rwandan government shows resistance in certain areas as well. As 
Véronique stated, conforming to international legal standards is an important goal, but cannot 
always be achieved in Rwanda’s unique post-genocide context.176 She said, “In circumstances, 
like post-conflict situations, and more specifically genocide circumstances, you probably need to 
apply certain things that may not necessarily be written in the books.”177 However, she did not 
elaborate when pressed further about what specific issues required unconventional methods. 
Foreign officials, on the other hand, were quick to identify these specific issues as politically 
charged court cases, like that of opposition leader, Victoire Ingabire.178  
Certain government officials expressed positive perceptions of their relationship with 
international development partners. For instance, Oliver in the Supreme Court was very satisfied 
with the trainings he received from Avocats Sans Frontières and MCC.179 He believed that the 
trainings were tailored to meet Rwandans needs since they were translated into Kinyarwanda and 
addressed their areas of weakness.180 Moreover, he argued that the development partners did not 
impose its own views on Rwandan professionals, but allowed Rwandans to define what they 
need.181 Véronique expressed a similar sentiment in describing her work with the MCC.182 
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Although the current threshold program is nowhere near its project goals, she remained 
optimistic that the MCC will understand Rwanda’s unique circumstances.183 She stated,  
“I think that from all the meetings I’ve attended with the judiciary, there’s a willingness to have 
these international norms respected: impartiality, fairness, some of these standards. But of course, 
you can’t be one hundred percent perfect because our circumstances are different. We are dealing 
with unusual stuff. So, therefore, where you have these imperfections, we want our partners to 
know where we are coming from. And we are ready to move forward, try our best and work better, 
but the system is not that perfect as our partners may wish.”184 
On the other hand, she also offered another view in stark contrast, arguing that the 
trainers provided by most development partner agencies in the judiciary, like USAID, often 
employ foreign trainers rather than local trainers.185 “The type of technical transfer of knowledge 
you are bringing from a professional from these stable democracies and stable judiciaries, is it 
really relevant?” she asked.186 Even with translations to Kinyarwanda, she argued that because 
certain words are extremely difficult to translate accurately, considerable meaning is lost during 
trainings.187 
In reference to MCC projects specifically, Véronique argued, “copying and pasting 
programs doesn’t work.”188 Although, the MCC tailors certain elements of its development 
projects to suit host country needs, the MCC uses the same indicators in every country.189 This 
seems to be another source of tension among some government officials, who believe that the 
indicators fail to consider Rwanda’s history of genocide. USAID, for instance, uses 
independently gauged indicators from Freedom House and the World Bank to evaluate progress. 
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However, in the eyes of one government official this is “very unfair,” considering that Rwanda is 
judged by the same standards as other countries that have never experienced war, let alone 
genocide.190  
Furthermore, Jean-Paul of the JRLO Secretariat argued that the development partners are 
not making any effort to harmonize or align their projects with the sector.191 He said that there is 
a discrepancy between the actions of the Kigali offices and the directions given by their 
headquarters.192 Normally, the Kigali offices are cooperative and willing to align with 
government projects. But once the project takes a direction different from headquarter priorities, 
Kigali offices are limited in their alignment with the sector.193  
In reference to the sector strategy, the JRLO Secretariat stated its role is to facilitate the 
flow of information between development partners and government institutions.194 Like 
individuals working for development partner agencies, government officials also stated that data 
transfer and information gathering is a difficult challenge within the sector. In addition, the 
JRLO Secretariat actively avoids political discussions with its development partners because 
“that is not [their] business.”195 Jean-Paul argued that the new indicators introduced by the Dutch 
measuring the independence of the judiciary are politically charged and are therefore irrelevant 
to its objectives.196 According to him, most development partners “have no idea what is in the 
sector strategy.”197 Furthermore, MCC fails to attend regular sector meetings, thereby straining 
relations with government institutions and other development partners.198 Despite these 
difficulties with MCC, the JRLO Secretariat is largely unable to argue against its policies. 
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Because USAID receives directives from its Washington headquarters, individuals on the ground 
are typically unable to change course.199 Rwandan government officials perceive this as 
insensitive to Rwandan needs and circumstances.200  
Overall, Rwandan government officials argue that the justice sector is improving 
gradually and has already overcome many obstacles. While there is willingness to reform, 
government officials urge development partners to align more with government initiatives and 
tailor programs to Rwanda’s unique circumstances. For several government officials, this meant 
granting leniency on certain indicators in difficult areas, like case backlog reduction and court 
cases involving genocide ideology.201 Without contextualized indicators and projects, 
development partners purportedly have misleading interpretations of Rwanda’s current 
situation.202 
Both sides of the justice sector, government officials and development partners are 
willing to reform in some ways. But, both sides are also restricted in the way and the extent to 
which it is able to reform. The policies and directives of its headquarters restrict development 
partners. On the other hand, Rwandan government institutions cannot move forward unless more 
development partners are more closely aligned with their development agenda. On the whole, 
research participants did not believe that differing judicial values engendered conflicting visions 
in the justice sector, but rather different historical experiences. These different experiences yield 
a diverging prioritization of values and objectives. 
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 Throughout the ISP period, I encountered several challenges due to research restrictions 
as well as time limitations. As a result of restrictions imposed by my university’s Institutional 
Review Board, I was required to only take handwritten notes, only interview research 
participants fluent in English, and not record any identifying information about respondents to 
preserve confidentiality. While interviewing participants, it was challenging to record every 
answer. But, with practice I gradually developed a more efficient note taking system that allowed 
for more accurately transcribed interviews. Another research challenge was only being able to 
interview people fluent in English. This restriction undoubtedly skewed my findings, in that I 
was only able to interview highly educated English-speaking professionals in the justice sector, 
thereby excluding those who only spoke Kinyarwanda and/or French. Finally, my research 
restrictions in preserving interviewee confidentiality was limiting in being able to analyze 
individuals’ opinions in the personal context of their job, nationality, and background.  
 Other challenges arose due to the time limitations of the ISP research period. For 
instance, the amount of interviews I could conduct was mainly dependent on participants’ 
availability. Given the time, I would have interviewed several other key individuals who are 
currently abroad. Moreover, I would interview more individuals in each justice sector institution 
if given more time for research. This would include, for example, several key officials in each of 
the fourteen government institutions and the twelve development partner agencies. But due to 
time constraints, I was only able to interview individuals in three government institutions and 
three development partner agencies. Finally, if I were to conduct this study again, I would 
include more women in my research participant pool. Due to participant availability, I only 
interviewed one female professional in the justice sector. This is not, however, indicative of the 
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gender demographics of the Rwandan justice sector. In fact, a number of the high-ranking 
officials in development partner institutions and government institutions are women, but were 
unavailable for interviews.  
 My recommendations for future research in this area are three fold. First, further research 
should address the unique role of NGOs within the justice sector and their interplay with larger 
development partner agencies and government institutions. Second, future research should 
analyze progress over time in the variety of institutions involved. This would include an in-depth 
analysis of each of the ongoing development projects and its relation to the JRLO Sector 
Strategy. Another interesting focus area would be the planning dialogue surrounding the 
formation of a new sector strategy for 2012 to 2015. Finally, future research ought to include 
more interviews with multiple individuals in each sector organization to obtain more varied 




 Rwandan and foreign intellectuals highlighted their own different judicial values through 
academic debates surrounding Gacaca and the ICTR. The trials of cooperation between the 
Rwandan government and the ICTR also presented another arena of contention over competing 
visions of justice. While Gacaca represented a justice system firmly rooted in Rwandan cultural 
values, the ICTR represented a justice system rooted in Western classical judicial values. The 
main objective of this research addressed the question of whether these competing judicial values 
continue to appear in the space of justice sector reform. 
 After interviews with key individuals in three government institutions and three 
development partner institutions, it became evident that considerable friction existed among the 
different justice sector actors. Government officials were unhappy with the failure of 
development partners to report their budget and project details to the JRLO. On the other hand, 
individuals at development partner agencies expressed frustration over government intransigence 
in politically charged cases. Through a number of interviews, it became evident that the root 
causes of contention are not founded in differing judicial values. In fact, most participants 
emphasized their shared values with other institutions. Rather, the main cause of tension is the 
different prioritization of these values in the variety of institutions involved in the justice sector. 
Each of the fourteen government institutions undoubtedly has its own individual targets and 
methods. Likewise, each of the development partner agencies also has its own objectives and 
projects. The contentious nature of the justice sector, therefore, lies in the ongoing struggle 
between maintaining institutional independence and harmonizing with the sector at large.  
 This is especially true in the case of certain development partner agencies. For instance, 
the MCC Justice Strengthening Project is not aligned with the JRLO and does not aim to be. 
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Through restrictions imposed by USAID directives from Washington, individuals working for 
the MCC have little freedom to align with Rwandan government objectives. Moreover, some 
individuals at certain European agencies feel that reporting project budget size to the Rwandan 
government will indicate their failure to align more with government objectives. As a result, the 
JRLO has difficulty in calculating the true size of the sector. This struggle between maintaining 
independence and harmonizing is also evident at the Rwandan government level. Certain 
government officials described their efforts to push development partners to only hire local 
Rwandans for development projects so they “understand our context.”203  
These opinions highlight the different prioritization of values. Individuals in development 
partner institutions highlighted the importance of achieving international legal standards with a 
human rights focus on issues like independence of the judiciary and treatment of prisoners. On 
the other hand, government officials believed that failure to achieve these goals were not 
indicative of government unwillingness to reform. Rather, failure to comply with all international 
legal standards demonstrated the unavoidable consequences of a post-conflict society. Most 
government officials argued that understanding the political and historical context of Rwanda 
was key to improving the justice sector.  
In understanding the unique relationships between development partners and government 
institutions, it is important to note the individual relationships that allow the justice sector to 
function. As Matthew of USAID stated, people often forget about “the warm bodies in the 
room.”204 Interviews with these key individuals highlighted the personal relationships each had 
with other individuals across the sector. As a result, the justice sector functions through personal 
relationships formed across different institutions. Overall, government institutions and 
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development partners share many of the same judicial values as outlined in their overlapping 
objectives.  
The main source of tension between actors is rooted in the different prioritization of these 
values. Each individual interviewed belonging to either government institutions or development 
partner agencies believed in the importance of reform and their organizations willingness to 
carry out that reform. As a result, the justice sector has made tremendous strides in building 
institutional capacity with the guidance of development partners and NGOs. Nevertheless, there 
remains room for improvement. The ongoing struggle for institutional independence versus 
sector alignment will undoubtedly continue in the upcoming discussions of the next JRLO Sector 
Strategy. Actors involved in justice sector reform in Rwanda play a unique role in re-shaping the 
judicial fabric of a post-conflict society. The fashioning of a system moving toward full 
compliance with international legal standards is undoubtedly the product of effective 
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Objectives: The purpose of this study is to develop a deeper understanding of: 
 
• Perceptions surrounding justice sector reform and the relationship between Rwandan 
government institutions and its development partners 
 
o Government of Rwanda:  
 What are important judicial values and current priorities for individuals in 
this field? 
 How do individuals perceive the work of international development 
partners in justice sector reform? 
 What do individuals think of their development partners’ indicators used 
to measure progress? 
 Are these indicators a fair assessment of progress? 
 
o International development partners: 
 What are important judicial values and current priorities for individuals in 
this field? 
 How do individuals perceive the work of the Rwandan government in 
justice sector reform? 
 What do individuals think of Rwandan indicators used to measure 
progress?  
 Are these indicators a fair assessment of progress? 
 
• How do these individuals reconcile differing perceptions of justice 
 
o Government of Rwanda:  
 What challenges or opportunities do individuals face in light of differing 
targets or indicators? 
 How do Rwandan professionals implement reform if certain projects are 
not in line with their own visions of justice?   
 
o International development partners:  
 What challenges or opportunities do individuals face in light of differing 
targets or indicators? 
 How do international development partners implement reform if there are 






Transcribed Interviews  
Alfred of the European Commission on 29 November 2010  
Alfred (A): I arrived last mid July. That’s four months. So probably don’t grasp every aspect but 
the problem or the issue or whatever, the domain. It’s my first position for the EU. I used to work 
for the ICTR before. For the defense team. The media case.  
Maria Sebastian (MS): Could you speak a bit more about your experience with the ICTR? How 
did you find the transition in working for the ICTR and later working for the EU?  
A: I had a break in between. There was certainly some kind of connection between my previous 
work and this one. But there is no direct link between the two. As far as my experience with the 
ICTR is concerned, I have mixed feelings. But, it was very interesting. I was very lucky to work 
with this case. It was a very interesting case. The people I worked with were great. But my 
appreciation of the tribunal or the tribunal’s work is rather mixed. Mitigated, I would say. Our 
problem with the ICTR is the quality of the work, which was done there. Sometimes it was very 
frustrating. 
MS: What in particular did you find frustrating? 
A: Political dimension is far too present in every case. The fact that we are trying individual 
cases and not some kind of cause, that I think is a big issue when you’re dealing with criminal 
cases. We are supposed to try to assess the responsibility, the criminal responsibility of an 
individual. Yea, it’s too much of a political showcase, I think.  
MS: Did you find that the government of Rwanda was receptive to your work while you were in 
the ICTR? Or cooperative? 
A: Working for the defense, I mean we’ve been to Rwanda, maybe five or 6 times for criminal 
investigation. And we did not have much problem with the authority. They were generally 
speaking, quite cooperative. Sometimes, it was the ICTR Prosecutor that was not that 
cooperative, in terms of circulating documents, exculpatory evidence, and all these kind of stuff. 
If we want to take a broader picture, one of the problems with the cases is evidence. How to 
access evidence and the quality of evidence. To an extent, there were some big problems, yes. I 
would say that too many witnesses came from the conduit of the NGO Ibuka which is a 
Rwandese one, but very linked to the government. They were not always reliable people. That’s 
one of the issues. My humble opinion.  
MS: And this was in what year? 
A: The case itself started in September or October 2000 and the first decision came in December 
2003. And then the appeal in 2006 or 2007.  
MS: Could you speak about your work with the EU? 
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A: Sure, so I’m in charge of the justice and governance corporation. You are more interested in 
the justice sector? So, since this year we have the budget support program. Before, it was more 
of a program-based approach. So you have a program with various institutions within the justice 
sector. Plus we have a program with the NGOs, that’s a different kind of institution. So, with the 
government institutions we used to have this kind of program based approach with the judiciary, 
with the NPPA, the police, and since this year we have started what we call budget support 
approach. So, in this instance it’s sector budget support. So we give money directly to the 
budget, to the Rwandan budget and the part obviously of the justice sector. Our way to have 
some kind of input and also get some information and feedback from the Rwandan government. 
That’s how it works, which I think with sector budget support approach is quite interesting. It’s 
far more holistic. It’s an improvement. There were some conditions, obviously. But, to put this in 
place. For instance, you  didn’t have this kind of sector, JRLO sector, which I think is interesting 
to have that in Rwanda because you can see all the institutions have to work together, all the 
stakeholders have to work together. Government institutions, DPs, also non-state actors, there are 
some NGOs present in the sector. 
   
A: I believe we should give them a bigger role in the sector. To acknowledge their role, and give 
them a bigger place. But, yea I think it’s quite interesting, because it’s a good forum to share 
experiences, share assessment, and that was an interesting way forward. The justice sector in 
Rwanda is obviously had many problems. It goes without saying. 
 
MS: So, with the budget approach. You said it’s more holistic? Are your objectives more aligned 
with the Rwandan government’s that way? Or do you give complete leeway to the government? 
 
A: No we don’t. It’s one of our principle action to try to align our action with the government 
approach. And obviously with the sector budget approach, we are aligned because we are 
discussing what kind of policy we should put in place and then it is implemented by the sector, 
by giving money directly to the sector. 
 
MS: So, there is policy dialogue? 
 
A: There is policy dialogue. There is policy dialogue within the sector and you also have more 
political level dialogue, through Article 8. If there is a big issue, the Minister and the 
ambassadors, they can talk on every topic, including obviously governance, justice, could be 
anything. We have a different conduit for this kind of dialogue. 
 
MS: And are your measuring systems mostly? Did you work with the Rwandan Governance 
Advisory Council? 
 
A: Their input in the justice sector is not big. They did one of the studies. I worked with the Joint 
Governance Assessment Process, which is a different matter. But, with the sector, what we have 
is a set of indicators that was agreed upon by the sector and a specific set for our sector budget 
support, I think three donors which give the money with this kind of sector budget support: the 
EU, the Netherlands, and Belgium. We have got a set of indicators, because the sector itself has 
what we call a monitoring and evaluation framework. So that is a tool to assess shortcomings, 
 60 
progresses, everything, but we also have a specific set, some are obviously to assess whether or 
not we are going to disperse the money. That’s how it works. And last October it was I think, we 
got a common review of the sector, one in September/October, we call it the backward looking 
review, so we look at the progress in the last fiscal year. And roughly we assess whether there 
were some improvements, and whether there were some shortcomings.  
 
MS: Could you speak more about the indicators that are used in the monitoring and evaluation 
process? 
 
A: One of my criticisms would be that there are far more quantitative rather than qualitative 
indicators. To have a real assessment of what happened and understand the shape of the sector, 
only looking at these indicators, doesn’t give you the best picture, I mean the more accurate 
picture of the sector. It’s very difficult to assess with this kind of sector, with infrastructure, 
there’s the number of kilometers of roads; it’s easy. But with justice that’s something I think that 
still needs to be improved, the indicators. There have been some improvements already, but still 
there’s still room for more improvement.  
 
MS: And so the indicators that are more quantitative rather than qualitative belong to the 
Rwandan government or its development partners? 
 
A: They were agreed upon by all the government institutions and the development partners, one 
of the problems with reporting is quite difficult still to sometime to have in a timely fashion, 
data. Some institution, I know that the sector itself has its own permanent secretary. And they 
work quite well. Our rule is to call him about the sector and convene our meetings, monthly 
meetings. So, there’s lots and lots of discussion going on. But it’s always a problem to have 
proper data, and getting back through the permanent secretary. So we can have this kind of 
informed discussion. There have been some improvements. But, problems don’t always come 
from the government institutions; they also come from the development partners. We are also 
late to give the permanent secretary what we have done with various institutions, we haven’t 
given to them. There have been some improvements. Still, it’s been a problem I think, reporting 
for which there are obvious reasons. If we don’t have the data, it’s even more difficult.  
A: Getting data is quite difficult. The sector itself is quite new for all the institutions and all its 
stakeholders. It takes time. In a sense, it imposes some kind of change of mindset because as a 
sector, especially for the institutions which get the money at the end of the day, they need to 
cooperate between themselves and understand that if one doesn’t do it’s job properly, there will 
be consequences for the whole sector. Because, we are giving money to the sector, and not just to 
the judiciary, or to the NPPA, or to the prison. If the prisons have some problem, then it has 
some consequences for the whole sector. Because if one of the indicators is in the red, it’s a 
problem. We had this problem this year. One of the indicators with regard to prison 
overpopulation is in the red. They haven’t achieved the set targets, maybe because it was too 
high. Maybe it was not possible for them. But still, we have this target, and we have to deal with 
it. And that’s a problem for the whole sector and that has a lot of difficulty to get more 
information to try to argue the case to see if whether or not we can disperse at least part of the 
money that is supposed to be dispersed and all these sectors will lose half a million Euro. Which 
is huge, for Rwanda. It’s huge.  
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MS: How do you assess whether or not the money actually gets to the government? Is it 
proportional to the amount of targets they achieve?  
 
A: We’ve got this program of 12 million Euros for four years. So that’s three million every year. 
And the two first years, it has already been dispersed even though it was started this year, it has 
already been dispersed. The first tranche. What we call fixed tranche. There was a global 
assessment of a set of fourteen indicators. And we are ok to disperse the first one because it was 
pre-financing. And the second one we were ok because there were enough improvements we 
agreed to disperse 3 million again. And the next one will be in July 2011 and it will be 3 million 
again. One that we call the fixed tranche, so that’s still the global assessment of the entire sector, 
improvement within the whole sector. One that we call the viable tranche and it is assessed on a 
set of four indicators only. And out of these four indicators, we’ve got one in the red. So we will 
probably have to reduce it by half a million because the viable tranche is 2 million, so if we have 
a program with one in the red, then it’s a quarter of this 2 million, that’s 500,000 Euro less. So, 
we will probably only disperse 2.5 million Euros next year. There’s still a possibility of the 
sector to give us more information or if there’s some real improvement in the next six months, 
maybe we’ll be able to revise our position. But, the current situation, the current position is that 
we’ve got one indicator in the red. So, that could be a problem next year for the dispersement 
[sic] of viable tranche. And it’s going to be the same for the following year, the last year of the 
program.  
 
MS: Do you think the Rwandan government and its development partners have different sets of 
judicial values that influence its monitoring and evaluation systems? 
 
A: It’s a tricky question, I think. First, I mean you are talking about the government on one side 
and the development partners on the other one. The development partners, maybe we have the 
same values but we have different results or different approaches. I mean you are also talking 
about individuals. And it’s the same with Rwandan institutions. There are 14 institutions within 
the sector and it can vary from one person to the other, from one institution to the other. And 
obviously, we’ve got some. I would rather say that we don’t always give the same priorities to 
different values. I would more put it this way. And obviously our assessment is not always the 
same, but with the sector, the bottom line is that we have to work together. And it’s a forum for 
discussion in the sector. And sometimes it’s also a forum to overcome our…To that extent, the 
sector is a forum for discussion to overcome some of our differences, or differences within 
government institutions, which is interesting. To improve collaboration between the various 
stakeholders, which doesn’t mean that we always agree, obviously. I mean, I told you earlier on 
that I think that there are some problems with the indicators that are far more quantitative based 
rather than qualitative. That might be one of our differences between some of the development 
partners and the government. There might be some cultural thing too. Figures are ok, but we’ve 
got more, for instance, the sector has put in place what we call Maison d’Access a Justice (MAJ), 
so that’s very nice, it works well, it’s ok. We have achieved this policy action and now there are 
30 MAJ in Rwanda, one per sector. But, the legal aid provided by these MAJ are provided by 
lawyers, I don’t even know if they’re lawyers, jurists employed by the government and that’s 
another obvious problem of independence of justice and most of the funds allocated to legal aid 
has gone through this particular venue or conduit, so there’s no more money for the Bar 
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Association to provide legal aid. Is it always confrontational? No. I would not say that. It’s more 
gray than black and white. Always. 
 
MS: When these differences arise, how do you communicate with the government or the 
Permanent Secretary on how to fix these problems? 
 
A: We’ve got regular, what we call technical working group, so it’s changing or it’s also a forum 
for various stakeholders to report what has been done. It is chaired by an institutions and co-
chaired by one of the development partners. So, this is where we discuss the main issues of the 
sector, there’s one on budgeting and planning, one on monitoring and evaluation, one on ICT, 
I’m less involved in that technical working group, but it’s a big, big project of harmonizing and 
announcing ICT between all the governmental institutions. And one more on content. This is 
where we discuss problems of the whole sector.  
 
MS: What sorts of problems did the sector encounter this year? What were some of the main 
discussions in these meetings since you signed on in July? 
 
A: The main discussion, I think most of the time since I came was devoted to the last joint sector 
review, it was a big assessment for the sector, for this year, for the last fiscal year, which will be 
the base for the title of dispersement [sic]. And as I told you, one of the big issues was getting 
data in time. That’s less on content, but that’s really where we spent a lot of time. In terms of 
more content issue, we have one of the big issue of the sector is backlog cases, either in the 
judiciary but also in the NPPA. And we put in place a taskforce to deal with that. I think we will 
do some interesting work. That I think is a good example of what the sector can achieve. 
Because it’s been a problem in Rwanda for years, the backlog of cases and we sent to the sector I 
think we will be in a position to have new, alternative solution and to try new solution because so 
far it has been only trying to hire contractor judges and contractor prosecutors, which I mean is a 
program financed by the EU, which is good to get rid of the existing backlog, but it’s no solution 
for the future. So, with this taskforce, we will be in a position to try some new solution and to 
follow up next year what can be done, what has been done.  
 
MS: What are the primary objectives of the taskforce?  
 
A: The taskforce will launch some studies, a pilot project by I think it will be financed by the 
German corporation and it will be financed by one of the best and most active in the justice 
sector in Rwanda, which is RCN. It’s a Belgium organization, Justice and Democracy. They are 
very active in the justice sector. For instance, they are one of the two international organizations, 
which take part in our working group. So, yea they will try to assess what can be done. And 
especially will try to find systems so less cases enter the system. So, there’s some kind of 
selection before getting into the poorly substantiated cases that then goes to the prosecutor and 
goes to the court and which are dismissed at the end of the day. So, there is no point in spending 
our very limited resources and the very limited resources of the sector and the judiciary on cases, 
which are not substantiated. At the very beginning of the process by the police. That I think is 
very positive.  
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Veronique of the Ministry of Finance on 2 December 2010 
 
V: I don’t have a deep understanding of the justice sector reform as such. My portion of my 
work goes with the justice sector along with the Millennium Challenge’s Corporation project. 
So, the kind of information that I may have may be related to that kind of section, simply 
because I don’t work with the sector as such. I deal with different ministries in other capacities, 
and therefore, the knowledge is not that much. However, I of course have some personal 
understandings. But, that’s just my personal perspective. I don’t have a deeper understanding of 
the justice sector per se because I don’t really work directly so much engaged with them as such.  
 
MS: So you worked with the MCC Justice Strengthening project?  
 
V: Yes. I am the coordinator on behalf of the government on the MCC projects and that includes 
all five projects. So one of them is the Justice Strengthening project with the justice sector, that’s 
my only connection with the justice sector per se.  
 
MS: What exactly is your role with the MCC? 
 
V: MCC project is very different from any other project because this is a project from the 
government. It’s not from the development partners, or it’s not from the implementing partners. 
It’s purely the government. What it means is that the MCC which is the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, comes up with these indicators every year and these indicators they show that you 
are short on ABCD. For Rwanda’s case, it was voice and accountability indicator, ruling justly 
indicators, and political rights. So, there were three areas that the government determined were in 
the red in terms of indicators, and the Rwandan government came up with proposal of their own 
where they think they can address some of the issues that they have within the indicators. So, I 
was hired by the government to work together with USAID to come up with certain key 
activities in areas they think can really improve some of these indicators, which is voice and 
accountability, civil liberties and political rights. So, among other things, all these are really in 
governance, so we came up different programs that we thought would really help in terms of 
improving our indicators in governance. This, for example, included training the judges in 
professionalism in the judicial sector.  
 
V: Of course we realized that there were questions about whether the judiciary was independent. 
Whether they were competent. But we thought, you cannot be independent unless you have the 
professional know how. Independence comes with the mind. Nobody can give you any 
independence unless you know what you are doing and you do it rightly and you can easily 
manipulate the executive in terms of the back up in terms of knowledge, in terms of trying to 
know what you are doing. So, we realized that needed to do some things to help the law reform 
commission process that the government was setting up. There was confusion within the laws 
because people don’t know exactly which laws have been replaced, whether there’s no proper 
mechanisms on how the judges or how the prosecutors or whoever in the law was in the judiciary 
understood these changes. There should be some equipment to assist people on how to 
understand that these ones have replaced these laws. We thought maybe that the drafting needed 
to be empowered in terms of professionalism. We understood that there should be some 
trainings. Even to the advocates and the bar association. There was however much you train the 
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judges, however much you capacitate the prosecutors, but if the bar is not that really equipped, 
and then it won’t really help much in knowledge and skills. So, that also goes with the 
parliament in terms of drafting laws, in terms of the parliament, sometimes to give input and 
maybe there should also be a procedure on how the parliament should work with different civil 
society in getting their input. So, we developed this proposal in that way with the government. 
We were contacting different ministries of the government, ministry of justice, ministry of local 
government that has local officials, the ministry of internal affairs, which has the police, which is 
one of the beneficiaries of these projects. We also worked with the ministry of information, in 
training journalists and improving their capacities, which ties into the voice and accountability. 
The ministry of local government that has the civil society and local government officials. So, 
we developed some of these indicators ourselves within the government, but of course with the 
USAID staff and especially the governance unit. So, we came up with what we made sure we 
could somewhere improve our judiciary.  
 
MS: So, what sorts of improvements or challenges have you experienced since beginning the 
project last year? 
 
V: Like all these projects, you have increments. USAID is the leading implementer in terms of 
the procurement rules that is covered by U.S. government relations. So, the benefits are there in 
terms of when you go to the judicial part, you have training a lot of judiciary staff, a lot have 
been trained by the projects. We think it’s very crucial that the capacity is increased. People are 
told constantly on the changing circumstances, on how the laws can be interpreted, judgment 
writing skills, drafting skills. And there’s a lot that has been done especially in terms of the MCC 
project. It has trained even more than anticipated. And it has used very good trainers. So, that 
was really very good. 
 
V: Apart from that, we have also among the projects, which we thought was lacking, was the 
equipments, the portals, the drafting systems that were supposed to be within the ministries’ 
concerns. So they can be done so quickly and later on can have a say in terms of giving input. 
For example, the civil society from the initiating ministry and any other person I think. So, the 
laws can be brought back to the people, and the people can have a say. Some of this equipment is 
already rendered and installed in place. They are not yet in practical use. However, I feel that 
everyone is very excited about them. And I think they should be signs for what has been 
achieved. 
 
V: Challenges, of course, they are there. For example, if you are trying to train the prosecutors 
and judges and everyone and you are training. These people have to be trained, but at the same 
time they have to work. So, you face a challenge in terms of whether these institutions still have 
people available. But, you have low capacity, you have low staff, you have few people in the 
ministries, in this judicial sector. And at the same time, we want them to be trained. So, one or 
the other will have a shortfall. When we are dealing with the training of some of the prosecutors 
or judges, some of the cases will have to wait for some time to have this training in terms we 
don’t have enough staff for some of them to undergo training and the others to continue to work 
because of a shortfall of staff in the sector. So, this is the number one challenge we have.  
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V: Probably, another challenge that we have when we look at the professionals, we would wish 
to have the technical people to come from the region. Who would come from the circumstances 
of Rwanda? Because Rwanda is in unique circumstances. You are judging post-genocide cases; 
you are dealing with a lot of perpetrators, sometimes with no evidence. So, what does it mean? If 
you are training these people to deal with certain unusual circumstances, you have to train 
professionals in how to deal with these unusual areas. Give them new tips on how to deal with 
such cases. And you get them easily. So you get these professional trainers from the U.S., from 
Canada, from elsewhere who have never been in some of these circumstances and therefore the 
skills don’t always match with the reality. And that’s a challenge that we anticipate. 
 
MS: And what kind of skills are you talking about? Like gathering evidence… 
 
V: Gathering evidence, judgment tips. For sure, there are things that should be at international 
respectable norms. But, in circumstances, for example, where you may have a dead witness, and 
you don’t have any eyewitnesses alive, and you have this person in jail for the last ten years, and 
people are telling you that everyone in this area, in this district are dead. How do you deal with 
these kinds of circumstances? What kind of issues would you apply? So in circumstances, like 
post-conflict situations, and more specifically genocide circumstances, probably you need to 
apply certain things that may not necessarily be written in the books or not necessarily don’t 
need to have professors or whoever is lecturing giving you tips on how to handle these 
circumstances. And this is a person that should have this kind of experience in these kinds of 
post-conflict situations. But if you have someone who is from a stable judiciary, where 
everything has to be ordered a certain way, you have challenges. 
 
MS: And so what sorts of tips do the American or Canadian lecturers say in those kinds of 
situations when there is that difference between a stable judiciary and a post-conflict judiciary? 
What are the sorts of things they teach that may be in opposition to what Rwanda needs? 
 
V: I can’t give an example per se. But, I have seen it in other contexts, not necessarily the 
judiciary, whereby you bring for example, a trainer from a stable judiciary, a stable country, with 
different rules being fought. And what does it mean, when someone comes in here, is that there 
is a lack of context. So the context is very different. And therefore, even if whatever you are 
transferring as knowledge does not really fit to these circumstances. This is a very common 
problem we have with all the different areas, not only the judiciary. This is in the media sector, 
especially. So, we tend to ask our partners to bring trainers from the region. But the challenge is 
do we have people from the region with those skills? So, it’s a very complicated circumstance 
sometimes. You want someone who is very qualified, but who does not fit the circumstances. So, 
it is a very common phenomenon in most post-conflict, or some of these countries where you 
have unusual things coming in. For example, you have the media sector in Rwanda, you have the 
international indicators, for example. And these international indicators, say that the free media 
should have ABCD, and you have a country, where in the 1994 genocide, because of this free 
media, and that is what is actually surprising, is where Rwanda was scored the highest in terms 
of having media freedom. So you have a circumstance where, everyone talks about whatever you 
want to talk about. And everyone says ok, they conduct in those circumstances. But, you don’t 
want to repeat the same problem. But when you bring a trainer who is supposed to teach 
journalists to make sure there is some sort of media freedom, and this person comes from stable 
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democracies, stable countries. Definitely, in this country, journalism is very professional. There 
are areas you cannot go. Even if you want to say something, there are certain things that you 
cannot talk about. Like this is hate media, or this is very dangerous for whatever reason. So, in 
circumstances like this one, you need to deal with the context, the cultural context, which is 
sometimes very different. So, when I say something, it’s something very different to someone 
else. So, the challenges comes the same. The type of technical transfer of knowledge you are 
bringing from a professional from these stable democracies and countries, is it really relevant? 
Maybe at some level, yea it is relevant. But, when it comes to the context, at the end of the day, it 
doesn’t give much. I may know all these norms, internationally acceptably norms, but if they 
don’t really fit within my people’s understanding, then the knowledge transfer doesn’t really 
happen.  
 
V: So, this goes with the judiciary as well. The judiciary is very difficult in this country as well. 
It has its own tremendous challenges in terms of all these capacity building issues, in terms of 
language, the language of instruction; some of these professors only speak in English or French. 
But people in the courts, they speak in Kinyarwanda. They don’t know the local language. So, 
certain words are very hard to translate in this so. These are enormous issues that we have with 
some of these trainers, but there’s nothing we can do. But, I can’t be specific and say it’s this in 
ABCD. But, I know it’s a challenge that comes back. And we try as much as possible to cope 
with it and ask the partners to please try and get someone from the region who knows and has a 
similar background and understands the context of the region. So, if you are dealing with raped 
women. Women, who are raped in these circumstances, you don’t have to mention them for 
example. You have to deal with them in a certain way, which was a challenge for the ICTR. 
When they come looking for an individual, by asking, “Were you raped?” And they couldn’t get 
an answer because there were also cultural issues. Maybe in the U.S. and Europe, there’ “Were 
you raped?” “Oh yea, I was raped.” Maybe that’s ok. But here, you can’t ask someone. There’s 
that stigmatization. People will run away from you. You may not be talking to anyone. So it’s 
vey good for a trainer to ask these questions within the context. And preferably we can get good 
trainers from the region or from within this context, which would be much easier for us. It would 
really help us more in terms of understanding the context. 
 
MS: Do you think that should apply to the indicators that are used as well? They use World 
Bank and Freedom House indicators.  
 
V: That’s what I think. I honestly think that Freedom House and World Bank measures Rwanda 
the same as it measures Tanzania, which has never had a war. You understand? It has these 
measurements, which is perfect. I think that’s good. But, if you tend to measure Rwanda and 
Tanzania, a country that has never had war. I think it’s very unfair. The context is very different 
in different countries. And therefore, the indicators should be contextualized. Otherwise, it 
doesn’t really give us much. This also goes with MCC findings, for example, they tend to 
measure countries in terms of like, when you look at some of the other countries they measure, 
these are countries that have been stable for many years. Others have just come out of war 
immediately. So, how do you have the same kind of indicators? That’s a completely wrong 
methodology. So, I think that the indicators should also be contextualized. Otherwise, you know 
hate media played a very big role in this country and then they should put measures to make sure 
that Freedom House knows what the media should look like. So, if you want media freedom? 
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Then, ok that’s perfect. I really think it’s very important that everyone has a right to speak, but it 
in a responsible way. Just be responsible and know whatever you talk doesn’t have any negative 
repercussions. If it is positive, then why not? If it is negative and you can be a watchdog to the 
government, that’s fantastic. If your interventions can help people improve their livelihoods, 
that’s perfect. But, if you’re saying Betty, you should kill Maria. Is that the freedom, we are 
looking for? So, I think it’s always very good that some of these indicators should be 
contextualized.  
 
MS: And so is there any move on the part of the Rwandan government to make them more 
contextualized? 
 
V: I think we didn’t want any duplication because the Rwandan government has what we call the 
Joint Governance Assessment on its own. And it’s trying to set up its own indicators. And, I 
think it should be in the final phases of that. But, what we discussed with the MCC in the 
beginning is “Look, we want flexibility. We want some of these changes in terms of getting 
supervisors or trainers from the region. We want people to understand our context.” And there 
was that move from the MCC. They totally understood. So, they ask you to design your own 
proposal. Because you are in a better position to get a cure for your sickness, more than they are. 
And I think it’s a good start. Of course, it’s not perfect, but it’s a good start. But, the joint 
governance assessment, the Rwandan Governance Advisory Council (RGAC) is doing exactly 
that. And the government is using some of these indicators.  
 
MS: They are for the most part different from the Freedom House and World Bank indicators 
that are used with the MCC? 
 
V: Most of them are quite similar. The differences are just very minor. I think even the Rwandan 
government are taken from these different international institutions, they borrowed, they have the 
ruling justly indicators, the economic freedom indicators, etc. And they are 90 percent are almost 
similar. But, maybe the methodology is different in terms of collecting data. But, they are really 
not very much different. They are still continuing of course to look at these ones. Because you 
can’t just say I’m going to use my own. You have to work comparatively with these other 
credible international institutions.  
 
MS: So, with the MCC if they don’t meet the indicators, they don’t make compact? 
 
V: Actually, that’s the rule. That’s what they say. They say that you have to improve ABCD, but 
of course MCC now is trying to change its ways in terms of understanding different indicators. 
Of course you cannot if you change the law today, don’t expect to see results in a few months. 
So, generally when they are giving you compact now. They are looking at the willingness of the 
government in making some institutions to work. Their willingness to change. The willingness of 
the government to listen and not only to complete certain things, but also how lives are 
improving. Because indicators are indicators. You can even put certain things on paper. You can 
have very good laws in place, but when they are not put in place does that have anything to do? 
So, I think MCC is trying to…before it used to look at those indicators and see how you are 
trying to make sure that the indicators are becoming more green and green. But now they are 
changing somehow in terms of trying to say, “Look, if the government is willing to give a lot of 
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change in eradicating poverty, I think it’s in line with what we’re trying to do.” So if the 
government is trying to make sure that everyone gets food and clean water, even if it’s not 
necessarily within the indicators they’re looking for, so there’s the possibility of affirming the 
compact. So, it’s trying to shift from its original way of giving countries compact. And I think 
that’s a good start. For example, if you were trying to say when I was coming up with the 
information bill, soon in two or three weeks it will be out. Everyone and every government 
official is supposed to give information to any and all journalists freely. So, that indicator it’s a 
very good policy. But, we don’t expect that everyone…because the government has to train its 
officials of the importance of giving this information. You don’t just put a bill and voila 
everything is as perfect as you wish. So, there are these processes that you have to go through 
and these will take time. So, I think MCC is correct in looking at some…even if there is some 
doubt, there are certain good policies that are put in place, regardless of the outcome yet, I think 
they will be considering that.  
 
MS: Do you think with the justice sector in particular, that there are different judicial values that 
the government may have that are different from its international development partners? 
 
V: Not really. I think that from all the meetings I’ve attended with the judiciary, there’s a 
willingness to have these international norms respected: impartiality, fairness, some of these 
standards. But of course, always they insist, you can’t be one hundred percent perfect because 
our circumstances are different. We are dealing with unusual stuff. So, therefore, where you have 
these imperfections, we want our partners where we are coming from. And we are ready to move 
forward, try our best and work better, but the system is not that perfect as people may wish so. 
Whether, they like it or not, trial will work longer than you may think, because there’s a very 
limited staff. The capacity of the judges is not really at the level of taking judgments quickly. At 
the professional level, the judges are very young, in other countries; they may have 50 years of 
experience. Here, you have people who finished a few years ago judges. So, don’t expect to have 
the good judgments, which would be fit internationally. But, when you are a country in 
transition, all these challenges are on the way. So, I think on the part of the government there is 
very much a willingness to make certain things up to international standards to be a part of the 
judiciary. But, of course not for immediate change, because of issues that make it sometimes 
imperfect.  
 
MS: Did you work with the Rwandan Governance Advisory Council for the Joint Governance 
Assessment? 
 
V: No, because personally, I’m not very much involved. Because MCC takes much of my time. 
But, I work on the projects where MCC is trying to address issues of governance. I work with the 
RGAC, I work with Professor Shyaka, who is the executive secretary. So we work together. And, 
in terms of measuring the MCC indicators and looking at what joint governance has in place. We 
work together, but I’m not directly involved with the joint governance assessment or advisory 
council. 
 
MS: How do you continue to work on these projects when you have such a strong view on what 
reform should look like that is so different from the international development partners? 
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V: I don’t keep quiet. I keep on telling them, because I am the liaison between the MCC and the 
government, I make sure that my government understands this. The ministries I work with. I tell 
the ministers, these are things we need to work with, and these are things that need to be in place. 
And when I go to the implementers, I say look, these are different circumstances and let’s go 
with the things that you really think can help poor people to fit into our circumstances. But don’t 
impose your view, and copy and paste and think it will work. It can’t work. It might on paper, 
but in reality it’s going to be very different. So, it’s not an easy process. But you try to make sure 
that people reach somewhere in a compromise.  
 
MS: So, they are receptive to your criticisms… 
 
V: Definitely. And it’s one thing I’ve realized since working with this department. Before I 
thought the government was very rigid and the government didn’t want some things. But, it was 
a very different story, when I talked to the ministers. They share some of these views. It’s this 
structure, that’s sometimes created, and you have layers where penetration is sometimes not that 
easy. Bureaucratic inefficiencies, which is like everywhere all over the world. But originally, 
they understand. They need that change. Everyone wants that change. But reaching there is a 
problem. And the way, people sometimes want to make it easy for everyone, the advocates, they 
won’t like it because there’s good money for them. So there are all these challenges that you go 
through. But, you know. You keep on. Change starts with you. And you know you can make it. 
